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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintifCAppellee 
v. 
VERNON E. CLIFFORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970681-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, a 
class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-505 (1995). The 
conviction was entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
and 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence found 
during the inventory search? 
A "bifurcated" appellate review standard applies for this issue: Underlying fact 
findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, with a "measure of deference" accorded 
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to highly fact-sensitive conclusions. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-40 (Utah 
1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-71 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This case involves the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
which states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
This case also involves portions of Utah statutes and Rules of Evidence. The 
relevant parts of those statutes and rules are set forth where necessary in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Vernon Clifford was charged with carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle under 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-505 (1995). Clifford moved to suppress the firearm found 
during an inventory search of the vehicle. A motion hearing was held and Clifford 
argued that the firearm should be suppressed because the State did not show that the 
department had standardized procedures or that the officer followed the procedures. 
Motion to Suppress Hearing Transcript ("HT") p. 37. 
The trial court made findings of fact on the record and denied Clifford's Motion 
to Suppress. HT p. 43. Clifford then entered a conditional plea to the charge of carrying 
a loaded firearm in a vehicle and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his Motion to 
Suppress pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Clifford received a 
60 day suspended jail sentenced and was ordered to pay $125 of the fine. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's denial of Clifford's 
Motion to Suppress. See, e.g.,State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Utah 1985). On 
January 5th, 1997, Deputy James F. Blanton was patrolling the East Division when he 
noticed a 1992 Chevy truck with a registration sticker that had expired in March of 1996. 
HT pp. 5-6,1. 20-25, 5-9. Blanton initiated a traffic stop, and the truck pulled into a 
parking lot on 3400 South and State Street. HT p. 6,1. 11-13. Blanton asked for 
Clifford's driver's license, registration, and proof of insurance. HT p. 7,1. 3-4. Vernon 
Clifford produced his license and registration, but was unable to provide any proof that 
his vehicle was insured. HT p. 7,1. 7-8,12-13. Although the registration certificate also 
indicated that the registration had expired nine months before, Blanton ran a check on the 
certificate and verified that March, 1996 was the expiration date. HT pp. 7-8,1. 25, 1. 
Clifford had informed Blanton that he had consumed alcohol, and Blanton called 
for a motors officer to conduct a field sobriety test on Clifford. HT p. 8,1. 11-12. The 
motors officer determined that Clifford was not intoxicated enough to be a danger, and 
Blanton issued Clifford a citation for the expired registration, lack of insurance, and 
informed Clifford that he would be impounding the vehicle. HT pp. 8-9,1. 21-23, 1-4. 
Blanton asked Clifford to take a seat while the inventory was conducted. HT p. 9,1. 8-11. 
Blanton also asked Clifford's passenger to step out of the truck. HT p. 9,1. 12-13. 
Blanton patted the passenger down for weapons, then proceeded to search the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle. HT p. 9,1. 14-15. 
Blanton first examined the passenger's side of the vehicle, and found three open 
beer cans in the floorboard. HT p. 11,1. 1-3. Blanton then proceeded to the driver's side, 
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where he immediately noted a brown leather holster in the pouch of the driver's door. HT 
p. 11,1. 10-11. Blanton pulled the firearm out, and Clifford spontaneously claimed 
ownership. HT p. 11,1. 19-21. Clifford told Blanton that there was a bullet in the 
chamber and the firearm was ready to shoot. HT pp. 11-12,1. 19-23, 1-5. Blanton took 
the firearm out of the holster and disarmed it, then placed Clifford under arrest for 
possessing a concealed loaded weapon. HTp. 17,1. 16-17,20-23. Blanton cuffed 
Clifford and placed him in his patrol vehicle. HT pp. 17-18,1. 21, 25, 1. Deputy Romero 
completed the inventory of Clifford's vehicle. HT p. 18,1. 2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly denied Clifford's Motion to Suppress the firearm because the 
firearm was discovered during a proper inventory search and was therefore admissible as 
evidence. A proper inventory search does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to 
be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment only prohibits 
those searches that are unreasonable, and an inventory conducted pursuant to regularized 
procedures is a reasonable search that is exempt from the warrant requirement. Inventory 
searches serve the important functions of securing the property of an individual whose 
car has been impounded, of shielding the police from claims that the contents of an 
impounded vehicle were disturbed or stolen, and allowing the police to discover 
dangerous conditions within an impounded vehicle. 
A valid inventory search must be conducted in compliance with regularized 
department procedures. The State carried its burden of demonstrating that Deputy 
Blanton had certain knowledge of his department's inventory procedures. The State is 
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not required to submit the department's written procedures. The State may establish 
certain knowledge of the procedures through the testimony of the officer who conducted 
the search. Blanton testified that he receives training in impoundments each year and 
also demonstrated detailed knowledge of his department's policies during cross-
examination. 
The State also carried its burden of establishing that Blanton acted in accordance 
with those procedures. The State is not required to submit written documents to meet this 
burden, and may prove that its agents complied with procedures through the testimony of 
the officer who conducted the search. Blanton provided testimony that adequately 
established that he acted pursuant to his department's policies. 
Blanton's inventory was not a pretext to search Clifford's truck for incriminating 
evidence. An inventory may be suspect as a pretext concealing an investigatory motive 
when the officer conducting the search fails to follow department procedures in 
significant ways. Blanton did not deviate from his department's procedures or otherwise 
act in any way that could give rise to a valid suspicion that his inventory search was 
conducted as a pretext to "rummage through" Clifford's truck. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY BASED ON RULE 
1002 BECAUSE THE COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE 
RULES OF EVIDENCE DURING SUPPRESSION 
HEARINGS. 
Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence does not require that the State produce 
the Sheriffs Department's written manual because the trial court is not bound by the 
Rules of Evidence at suppression hearings. Defendant argues that Rule 1002 requires 
that the State produce the written manual containing the Sheriffs Department's inventory 
and impound policy. However, the Utah Rules of Evidence do not apply to hearings on 
the admissibility of evidence. Utah R. Evid. 1001(b)(1). 
Rule 1101 states "The rules . . . do not apply in the following situations: (1) 
Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 104(a)." Utah R. 
Evid. 1101(b). Rule 104(a), Questions of admissibility generally, includes questions 
concerning the admissibility of evidence. Utah R. Evid. 104(a). 
During hearings on preliminary questions including the admissibility of evidence, 
the court is not bound by the rules of evidence. IdL Therefore, the trial court acted within 
its discretion when the court overruled defendant's objection based on Rule 1002 of the 
Rule of Evidence. 
Defendant claims that "this Court in Strikling, stated that 'the State could not 
carry its burden if it could not produce a written policy in the face of a [best evidence] 
objection to an officer's testimony concerning written [inventory] policies.'" Brief of 
Appellant p. 12. While this is a direct quote from this Court, the defendant omitted the 
beginning of this sentence that states "We note the possibility that the State could not 
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carry its burden . . . " State v. Strikling, 844 P.2d 979, 990 n. 12 (Utah App. 1992). This 
Court specifically stated in Strikling that "precedent [does not] require, that the 
government must submit written procedures in order to carry its burden of showing that 
its agents acted in accordance with standardized procedures when performing an 
inventory search of an impounded automobile." Id. at 989. 
The trial court correctly allowed Deputy Blanton to testify as to his understanding 
of the written policy rather than require the State to introduce the written manual. 
II. THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The trial court correctly denied Clifford's Motion to Suppress the firearm because 
it was discovered pursuant to a proper inventory search. The Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the state from proving charges with evidence discovered during an inventory 
search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 US 367, 744 (1987). Therefore, because Blanton 
properly impounded and inventoried Clifford's vehicle, the trial court did not err in 
allowing the firearm into evidence. 
Inventory searches of impounded vehicles constitute a well-defined exception to 
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Colorado 479 US 367, 745 (1987). 
Because of their mobility, automobiles are not entitled to the same rigorous warrant 
requirements and privacy expectations as a residence. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
US 364, 367 (1976). Inventory searches are not investigatory in nature, but serve to 
protect the contents of an impounded car, and shield the police from claims of disturbed 
or missing property when an impounded vehicle is recovered by its owner. Inventory 
searches are not unconstitutional intrusions because an inventory conducted pursuant to 
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standardized procedures is reasonable, and the Fourth Amendment only prohibits 
unreasonable searches. Opperman, 428 at 373. 
A. The State Established that Deputy Blanton had 
Knowledge of Departmental Inventory Procedures. 
The state established that Deputy Blanton was familiar with the Sheriffs 
Department procedures for inventorying an impounded vehicle through the detailed 
testimony offered at suppression hearing. In Strickling, this Court found that an officer 
had demonstrated certain knowledge of department policies based solely on the testimony 
he offered at trial. State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 990 (Utah. App. 1992) (affirming 
trial court's denial of Motion to Suppress evidence discovered during inventory search). 
The testimony given by Deputy Blanton is sufficient to find that he had certain 
knowledge of department procedures. In Strickling, the court stated that the government 
is required to demonstrate the existence of standardized procedures for regulating 
inventory searches. Strickling, 844 at 988. The only evidence that the government 
offered about the existence of department procedures was testimony from the officer who 
conducted the inventory search. Id. at 988. The inventory sheet used during the impound 
search was never offered into evidence. Id. at 989 n. 8. The court ruled that the officer 
demonstrated certain knowledge of department policies by testifying to the existence of 
those policies and his significant experience in carrying those policies out, describing 
what areas of the vehicle are subject to search, and responding to several questions during 
cross-examination about the procedures. Id. at 990. 
The present case is very similar to Strickling. Deputy Blanton provided testimony 
that his department does have standardized procedures on inventory searches and that he 
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attends classes concerning inventory searches each year. HT p. 16, 1-24. During cross-
examination the defense asked several questions concerning details of those procedures. 
Blanton's responses demonstrate close familiarity with those policies1. The State, 
therefore, carried its burden of demonstrating that Blanton had certain knowledge of his 
department's standardized procedures for conducting inventory searches. 
B. The State Established That Officer Blanton Adhered To 
His Department's Procedures While Conducting The 
Inventory Search. 
The State carried its burden of showing that Blanton complied with inventory 
procedures by providing testimony that Blanton had complied. The State does not need 
to offer more than testimony. Precedent does not require the government to submit 
written procedures in order to carry its burden of showing that its agents acted in 
accordance with their department's policies. Strickling, 844 at 979. Therefore, the 
testimony that Blanton provided demonstrating his compliance is sufficient. 
In Strickling, the court noted that the "pivotal determination is whether the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing was sufficient to support the finding that" 
the officer conducted the inventory search in accordance with the department's policies. 
Strickling, 844 at 988. In reaching its conclusion that the officer had complied, the 
appellate court looked to United States v. Kordosky. Id, at 989. In Kodorsky, the court 
JHT pp. 29-30,1.30, 1-9 
Q: Now your office, the sheriffs office, has a standardized policy on doing inventory searches. 
A: It does 
Q: And in that procedure or policy it sets out specifically how to deal with inventorying the contents. 
A: It does. 
Q: And how to deal with open or closed containers that you might run across. 
A: Yes. 
Q: Or how to deal with contraband or firearms. 
A: Yes. 
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held that the testimony of two police officers was sufficient to demonstrate that the search 
had been conducted in compliance with department procedures. United States v. 
Kordosky, 921 F.2d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 1991) cert, denied 112 S.Ct. 94. 
Blanton offered testimony that demonstrates that he followed his department's 
procedure. Blanton testified that he has received annual training in impounding vehicles 
where he was taught to inform the driver that he would be impounding the car, then begin 
inventorying. HTpg. 16,1.20-24. Blanton did follow this procedure with Clifford. 
After checking Clifford's registration to ensure that it had expired, Blanton advised 
Clifford that he would be impounding his vehicle. HT pg. 9,1. 1-4. After asking the 
passenger to step from the car, Blanton began inventorying the contents of the passenger 
compartment. HT pg. 9,1. 12-15. Blanton also testified that he used and signed a state 
tax impound form as required by his department for an inventory search of a vehicle 
impounded for expired registration. HT pg. 10,1. 5, 12-15. 
The defense argues that Deputy Blanton did not conduct a complete inventory 
search because he did not search every part of the vehicle. In State v. Sterger, the 
appellate court rejected similar reasoning. In Sterger, the defendant argued that the 
officer had not followed inventory procedures because he had not opened every closed 
container in the impounded vehicle, although department procedures provided that "[a] 
written inventory shall be made of all contents of the vehicle, both in opened, closed 
and/or locked containers." State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,126 (Utah App. 1991). The 
court found this reasoning unpersuasive, and relied on Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 
(1990) quoting "[t]he allowance of the exercise of judgment based on concerns related to 
the purposes of an inventory search does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Sterger, 
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808 at 126, FN 4. Therefore, the mere fact that Blanton did not open the glove 
compartment or climb behind the truck seats alone does not render the inventory search 
invalid. 
Furthermore, Deputy Blanton testified that Deputy Romero completed the 
inventory search because he was required to secure the firearm and arrest defendant. HT 
p. 10, 21-22. Up to that point, Blanton was conducting a thorough search, looking under 
the seats and checking the door pouches of the passenger compartment. HT. p. 11,1. 1, 
11, 23. Blanton testified that the moment he noticed the firearm in the driver's door 
panel, his attention immediately focused on the presence of the weapon. HT. p. 28,1. 16-
17. Blanton's responsibilities shifted in that moment from listing the contents of an 
vehicle impounded for expired registration to dealing with a loaded firearm and the man 
who was carrying it illegally. 
The fact that Deputy Blanton did not personally complete the inventory search 
render the search invalid. In State v. Sterger, an officer conducting an inventory search 
discovered marijuana in a vehicle involved in an accident. State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122, 
123 (Utah App. 1991). The officer discontinued the search because other responsibilities, 
such as removing the accident victims and arresting and transporting the defendant, took 
priority over completing the inventory. Sterger, 808 at 125. The inventory was not 
completed until two days later. Id at 124. The defendant argued that the search was 
invalid because department policies did not allow for bifurcated inventories. Id at 125. 
The court disagreed, stating that the fact that a bifurcated search was not specifically 
provided for in the procedures did not render the search illegal. Id. at 125. 
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The present case is quite similar to Sterger. Blanton discontinued the search when 
it became necessary for him to arrest and transport Clifford. Rather than wait for an 
extended period to complete the inventory, however, another officer, Deputy Romero, 
stepped in to handle the search. HT p. 10, 21-22. The fact that another officer completed 
the search does not mean that Blanton was not following procedure. The purpose of an 
inventory search is to protect the police from dangerous conditions, shield them from 
claims of missing or damaged property, and secure the property of the owner of the 
impounded car. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). The fact that another 
officer stepped in to continue the inventory search when Blanton was needed elsewhere 
does not interfere with these purposes, but makes their expeditious completion possible. 
III. The Inventory Search Was Not a Pretext For a 
Warrantless Investigatory Search. 
The inventory search exception to the requirement of a warrant does not apply 
when the inventory is actually a pretext to an "investigatory police motive". State v. 
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985). In other words, an inventory is not valid if it is 
merely a "fishing expedition for evidence." Sterger at 125. However, a search carried out 
in accordance with standard procedures tends to ensure that the intrusion is appropriately 
limited to a caretaking function. Opperman, 428 at 375. The existence of regularized 
procedures for handling inventory searches play a role identical to that of search warrants 
in guarding against arbitrariness in who and what officers select to search. Strickling, 844 
at 987. Inventories that were not conducted in compliance with department policies 
should not be upheld under Opperman. Id. at 987. 
13 
The defense argues that Blanton deviated from department procedures by not 
personally completing the inventory search. The fact that another officer stepped in to 
complete the search while Blanton was handling the arrest and transportation of Clifford 
does not render the search unconstitutional2. Blanton could, as the defense points out, 
have completed the search himself by leaving Clifford in the custody of another officer, 
but the Supreme Court has found that reasonable police regulations administered in good 
faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though the courts might as a matter of 
hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure. 
Bertine, 479 US 367, 374. The fact that Blanton did not personally complete the 
inventory, therefore, does not constitute a deviation from standard procedures that 
indicates a pretextual search. 
The defense also argues that Blanton did not decide to impound the vehicle until 
after exhausting other avenues of arresting Clifford. However, Blanton testified that he 
impounds ninety-nine percent of the vehicles where the owner has allowed the 
registration to lapse for a period as long as nine months. HT. pg. 32,1. 6-11. The 
moment Blanton realized that the car's registration had expired nine months earlier, 
before Blanton even initiated the traffic stop, there was only a one percent chance that 
Clifford's vehicle would not be impounded. Furthermore, the appellate court has held 
that, when an officer is confronted with registration violations, the determinative 
evidence is what the officer actually did, without regard to his motives in a particular 
case. Strickling, 844 at 987. In Strickling, the court was satisfied that the officer had not 
impounded the vehicle as a pretext for another motive where the officer had testified that 
he impounded a majority of the vehicles he stopped for expired registration. Id. at 987. 
2
 See discussion infra pgs. 12-13. 
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The defense also argues that Blanton's search is suspect because he began the 
search on the passenger side of the car. The defense reasons that because the passenger 
had been drinking, Blanton believed he would be more likely to find contraband in that 
portion of the vehicle. It is more likely, however, that Blanton began his search on the 
passenger side simply because he was already there. Blanton could not begin his search 
until the passenger had exited the vehicle. Blanton asked the passenger to step out, then 
patted the passenger down for weapons. HT pg. 9,1. 12-15. It was natural for Blanton to 
begin his search on the passenger side because he was already at the left side of the 
vehicle. 
The defense also attempts to compare Blanton's conduct to the behavior of the 
officer who conducted an invalid inventory search in Hygh. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
268 (Utah 1985). The defense, however, has misread Hygh. The officer in Hygh had 
neglected to involve the defendant in deciding how to secure the valuables in the 
impounded car, and the defense claims that Blanton's conduct is similar because he did 
not ask Clifford if there was anything of value in Clifford's car. HT. p. 24,1. 20-22. The 
court found the Hygh officer's failure to question the defendant about any valuables in 
the car indicative of pretext because the officer's department procedures specifically 
instructed the officer to question the defendant . Hygh, 711 at 269. The court, therefore, 
found the officer's conduct to be suspect not because he had failed to question, but 
because the failure to question deviated from department procedure. The failure to 
question was another example of noncompliance with department policies. Id. 
3
 D. PEOCEDURE AFFECTING ALL IMPOUNDS. 
1. When an impound occurs with the owner present, the officer should ask the owner if anything of 
value is in the vehicle . . . . Hygh, 711 at 269. 
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Furthermore, in State v. Johnson the defendant argued that the officer had 
conducted a pretextual inventory search because the officer did not give the defendant an 
opportunity to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his valuables. State v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987). While the court noted that the officer could 
have made other arrangements, the court held that failing to provide that opportunity does 
not eliminate the justification for taking inventory. Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454. The 
court looked to the language in Bertine stating that "the real question is not what could 
have been achieved but whether the Fourth Amendment requires such steps." Johnson 
IAS at 454. The court found that the interest the officers had in protecting themselves 
against claims of stolen property justified the inventory, therefore providing the 
defendant with another means of securing his property was not required under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 454. 
The court also looked to the surrounding circumstances to determine the existence 
of justification for the impoundment. Johnson IAS at 454. The court found that where 
the defendant did not have a driver's license and his companions were under the 
influence of controlled substances, the officers were justified in impounding the vehicle 
rather than giving the defendant the opportunity to dispose of his property himself. Id. at 
454. Blanton was confronted with a similar situation. Clifford was an uninsured driver 
whose registration had expired, and his companion had been drinking alcohol. Neither of 
them could properly move the vehicle from the parking lot. Blanton, therefore, was 
justified in impounding the vehicle rather than providing an opportunity for Clifford to 
remove the truck. 
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The inventory search Blanton conducted of Clifford's vehicle was not a pretext 
for a "fishing expedition for evidence." Blanton complied with department procedures 
and did not act in any way that indicates that his decision to impound the vehicle was a 
means of "rummaging through" its contents in a hunt for incriminating evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress because the search was a constitutional inventory search. The State established 
the Sheriffs Department's inventory procedures and that Deputy Blanton adhered to the 
procedures. Deputy Blanton's valid inventory search was not a pretext concealing an 
investigatory motive. Therefore, the denial of the motion should be AFFIRMED. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED \K\sQV_ day of November, 1998 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
Salt Lake County District Attorney 
TRINA A. HIGGINS 
Deputy District Attorney 
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